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Abstract
In two-sided markets, Myerson and Satterthwaite’s impos-
sibility theorem states that one can not maximize the gain-
from-trade while also satisfying truthfulness, individual-
rationality and no deficit. Attempts have been made to cir-
cumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite’s result by attaining
approximately-maximum gain-from-trade: the double-sided
auctions of McAfee (1992) is truthful and has no deficit, and
the one by Segal-Halevi et al. (2016) additionally has no sur-
plus — it is strongly-budget-balanced. They consider two cat-
egories of agents — buyers and sellers, where each trade set
is composed of a single buyer and a single seller.
The practical complexity of applications such as supply chain
require one to look beyond two-sided markets. Common re-
quirements are for: buyers trading with multiple sellers of dif-
ferent or identical items, buyers trading with sellers through
transporters and mediators, and sellers trading with multiple
buyers. We attempt to address these settings.
We generalize Segal-Halevi et al. (2016)’s strongly-budget-
balanced double-sided auction setting to a multilateral mar-
ket where each trade set is composed of any number of agent
categories. Our generalization refines the notion of compe-
tition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of
external competition and trade reduction. We also show an
obviously-truthful implementation of our auction using mul-
tiple ascending prices.
This is a full version of a paper presented in the AAAI 2020
conference.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been inves-
tigated for several decades in economics and in computer
science. It aims to find an efficient (high social welfare) al-
location of a set of items to a set of agents, while ensur-
ing that truthfully reporting the input data is the best strat-
egy for the agents. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auc-
tion (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) is a pillar
of mechanism design. VCG auctions maximize the social
welfare of the agents. They are dominant-strategy truthful
(DST) — each agent’s dominant strategy is to truthfully re-
port its preferences to the auction, regardless of what the
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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other agents report. They can also be made individually ra-
tional (IR) — no agent loses from participating in the auc-
tion.
More recently, there has been increased attention on auc-
tions for two-sided markets, in which the set of agents is
partitioned into buyers and sellers. As opposed to the one-
sided setting, where the auctioneer initially holds the items,
in the two-sided setting the items are initially held by the
set of sellers. The sellers express valuations for the items
they hold, and are assumed to act rationally and strategically.
Thus, the auctioneer is tasked with deciding which buyers
and sellers should trade and with what prices.
The growing interest in two-sided markets can be at-
tributed to various important applications. Examples range
from selling display-advertising on ad exchange platforms,
the US FCC spectrum license reallocation, and stock ex-
changes. However, little work has been done so far on the
next level of generalization, i.e., multi-sided markets.
In two-sided markets, a further important requirement is
strong budget-balance (SBB), which states that monetary
transfers happen only among the agents in the market. This
means that buyers and sellers are allowed to trade without
leaving the auctioneer any share of their gains and with-
out the auctioneer adding money into the market. A weaker
version of SBB, often considered in the literature, is weak
budget-balance (WBB). WBB only requires the auctioneer
not to add money to the market. The problem with weak
budget-balance is that the surplus of the auctioneer might
consume most of the gain-from-trade, leaving little gain for
the actual traders. This might drive traders away from the
market.1 Note that, in bilateral trade settings, VCG is usually
not even WBB except in special cases (Guo et al. 2013).
1 The following “trick” can be used to convert any WBB auc-
tion to an SBB auction: before the auction starts, remove a random
trader from the market; after the auction ends, give that trader all
the surplus (if any). We do not support this trick since it might
induce agents who have nothing to do with the auction (e.g. “sell-
ers” with nothing to sell or “buyers” with no money) to come to
the market, only because of the chance to win all the surplus. Like
Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), we focus on direct-trade auctions
— auctions that give/take money only to/from agents who actually
participate in the trade.
For double-sided auctions, the impossibility theorem of
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that one can not
maximize gain from trade (GFT, the difference between the
total value of the sold items for the buyers and the total value
of these items for the sellers) while also satisfying IR, DST,
and no deficit.
The seminal double-auction mechanism of
McAfee (1992) is DST, IR and WBB. It circumvents
Myerson and Satterthwaite’s result by compromising on
GFT: it may remove up to one deal from the optimal trade.
In case a deal is removed, it is the one with the smallest
GFT among the deals in the optimal trade; hence it attains
at least 1 − 1/k of the optimal GFT, where k is the number
of optimal deals. Thus, it is asymptotically optimal — its
GFT approaches the optimum when k →∞. 2
Recently, Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann (2016)
presented a SBB variant of McAfee’s mechanism, with sim-
ilar GFT guarantees. Their mechanism may remove up to
one buyer from the optimal trade, and it is the buyer with
the lowest value among the buyers in the optimal trade. In
case a buyer is removed, the remaining k − 1 buyers trade
with k − 1 sellers selected at random from the k sellers in
the optimal trade. 3
The complexity of practical requirements in areas such
as supply chain require one to look beyond double-sided
markets. As an example (Babaioff and Walsh 2005), a mar-
ket for lemonade may contain two kinds of sellers (lemon
pickers and sugar producers), two kinds of buyers (juice
drinkers and lemonade drinkers), and some intermediary
agents (lemon squeezers, lemonade mixers, etc.) Our goal
is to address such settings while keeping the strong budget
balance requirement.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our contribution is twofold: First we generalize
Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann (2016)’s SBB
double auction to a multi-sided market where the trade
set is composed of any number of agent types and any
number of copies of any agent’s type. Our generalization
refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions
by introducing the concept of external competition —
competition over who will act as a given participant’s trade
partner(s) (complementarity).
The expanded notion of competition allows us to pro-
vide a simple well-performing procedure that generalizes
(McAfee 1992)’s trade reduction. The shift to thinking in
terms of competition allows us to broadly address situa-
tions common to multi-sided auctions. These settings in-
2 McAfee’s mechanism is WBB because, when a deal is re-
moved, the values of the removed agents are used to set the prices
for the remaining agents: all buyers pay the value of the removed
buyer, and all sellers receive the value of the removed seller. Thus
there is a surplus that goes to the market manager.
3 Their mechanism is SBB because, when a buyer is removed,
his value is used to set the prices for all remaining agents: all k− 1
remaining buyers pay the value of the removed buyer, and the k−1
sellers selected at random receive the same value. Thus there is no
deficit and no surplus. Their mechanism has a variant in which a
seller may be removed, instead of a buyer.
clude trading entities that may be individuals or entire mar-
kets, transactions facilitated by zero or more intermediaries,
and goods that can be exchanged individually or in bundles.
These settings also encompass many common commer-
cial mechanisms including supply chains, distributed mar-
kets, security exchanges, and business to consumer auc-
tions. Historically each of these settings has been considered
unique and each presented the complex research problem of
finding a suitable mechanism (see section 5 for details).
Second, in addition to the direct-revelation multi-sided
auction, our result presents a multi-sided ascending-prices
auction that implements the same outcome. In the theory
of one-sided auctions, it is well-known that a second-price
direct-revelation auction and an ascending-prices auction are
strategically equivalent. In both auctions, the agent with the
highest value wins and pays the second-highest value. How-
ever, an ascending-prices auction has the advantage that it is
obviously truthful (see Li (2017) for formal definitions and
proofs). The practical advantage of an obviously-truthful
auction is that it is easier for people to understand that play-
ing truthfully is best for them, even if they are not experts in
game theory. This is particularly important when one deals
with complex multi-sided markets with many entities.
1.2 Paper layout
Section 2 presents the formal definitions. Section 3 presents
a special case of our extended multilateral auctions in which
each trade requires exactly one agent of each category. Sec-
tion 4 presents a more general case of our extended multilat-
eral auctions in which each trade requires a fixed number of
agents of each category, but this fixed number may be larger
than 1. Section 5 compares our work to related work. Section
6 presents some simulation experiments evaluating the per-
formance of our auctions. Section 7 concludes with some fu-
ture work directions. An open-source implementation of our
auctions, including example runs and experiments, is avail-
able at https://github.com/erelsgl/auctions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Agents and categories
A market is defined by a set of agents grouped into different
categories. N is the set of agents, G is the set of agent cat-
egories, and Ng is the set of agents in category g ∈ G. The
categories are pairwise-disjoint, so N = ⊔g∈GNg.
Each deal in the market requires a certain combination
of agents. We call a subset of agents that can accomplish
a single deal a procurement-set (PS). The PS recipe of the
market is a vector of size |G|, denoted by r := (rg)g∈G,
where rg ∈ Z+ for all g ∈ G. It describes the number of
agents of each category that should be in each PS: each PS
should contain r1 agents of category 1, r2 agents of category
2, and so on. As an example, the PS recipe of a standard two-
sidedmarket is (1, 1), since there are two agent categories—
buyers and sellers — and each PS should contain one buyer
and one seller.
As another example, consider a market with three cate-
gories of agents — buyers, sellers and transporters, and PS
recipe (1, 2, 2). In such a market, each deal requires a buyer,
two sellers and two transporters.
In general, one could think of markets with multiple PS
recipes; however, in the present paper we restrict our atten-
tion to markets with a single PS recipe, denoted by r.
Each agent i ∈ N has a value vi ∈ R, which represents
the monetary gain of an agent from participating in the trade.
The value of an agent is the agent’s private information. It
may be positive or negative. For example, in a two-sided
market, the value of a buyer is typically positive while the
value of a seller is typically negative. The agents are quasi-
linear in money: the utility of agent i participating in some
PS and paying pi is ui := vi − pi.
2.2 Trades and Gains
The gain-from-trade of a procurement-set S, denoted
GFT (S), is the sum of values of all agents in S:
GFT(S) :=
∑
i∈S
vi.
In a standard two-sidedmarket, the GFT of a PS with a buyer
b and a seller s is vb − vs, since the seller’s value is −vs.
Given a market (N,G, r), a trade is a collection of
pairwise-disjoint procurement-sets. I.e, it is a collection of
agent subsets, S1, . . . , Sk ⊆ N , such that for each j ∈ [k],
the composition of agents in Sj corresponds to the recipe r.
The total GFT is the sum of the GFT of all procurement-sets
participating in the trade:
GFT(S1, . . . , Sk) :=
k∑
j=1
GFT(Sj)
A trade is called optimal if its GFT is maximum over all
possible trades.
2.3 Competition
Our direct-revelation auctions are based on the concept of
competition between agents. Given a trade (S1, . . . , Sk), let
Nrm := N \ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪Sk) be the subset of agents who do
not participate in the trade (the “remaining market”).
Consider a single PS Sj , and an agent i ∈ Sj who belongs
to category g, i.e, i ∈ Ng. Then, a subset of agents T ⊆ Nrm
is called an external competition for i if adding i to T yields
a PS consistent with the recipe r, with a positive GFT:
GFT (T ∪ {i}) ≥ 0
In a simple two-sided market, the external competition of
a trading buyer is a non-trading seller whose value is suffi-
ciently high such that, combining the trading buyer with the
non-trading seller yields a pair with a GFT above 0.
In a three-sidedmarket with buyers, sellers andmediators,
with r = (1, 1, 1), an external competition of a trading buyer
is a pair of a non-trading seller and a non-trading mediator,
such that the GFT of the buyer+seller+mediator is at least 0.
3 One Agent Per Category
This section presents our two auctions for a special case in
which the single PS recipe in the market is a vector of ones,
so each PS must contain a single agent from each category.
Both auctions are parametrized by an ordering on the cat-
egories: each of the |G|! possible orderings yields a different
auction. The ordering should be fixed in advance and not de-
pend on the agents’ values.
We present the auctions using a running example with
three categories in the following order: buyers, sellers and
mediators. The recipe is (1, 1, 1). In each category there are
five agents. The agents’ values are:
• Buyers: 17, 14, 13, 9, 6.
• Sellers: -1, -4, -5, -8, -11.
• Mediators: -1, -3, -4, -7, -10.
3.1 External-competition auction
The auction requests the agents to report their values, and
then proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Optimal trade calculation. Order the agents in
each category by descending order of their value. Combine
the highest-value agents in each category to a PS. Combine
the next-highest-value agents in each category into a PS.
Keep constructing PS as long as the GFT of the constructed
PS is positive. The resulting set of PS is the optimal trade.
We denote by k the number of PS in the optimal trade.
In the running example, k = 3 and the optimal trade
contains the following PS: (17,−1,−1) with GFT 15,
(14,−4,−3) with GFT 7, and (13,−5,−4) with GFT 4.
The remaining market, denoted by Nrm, contains two buy-
ers 9, 6, two sellers −8,−11 and two mediators−7,−10.
Step 2. Order the procurement-sets in the optimal trade by
ascending GFT, such that, GFT(S1) ≤ · · · ≤ GFT(Sk). In
the running example, S1 is the PS (13,−5,−4).
Step 3. Consider the agents in S1 in the pre-determined
order of categories. Initialize i to the first agent in S1 by this
ordering. In the running example, it is the buyer 13.
Step 4. Look for an external competition to iwith a largest
GFT. There are two cases.
Case 4a. No external competition for i is found. Then, i
is removed from the trade (and added to Nrm), and we go
back to step 4 with i being the next agent in S1.
In the running example, we consider first the buyer 13.
The maximum GFT of a PS that contains this buyer and
agents from Nrm is −2, for the PS (13,−8,−7). This GFT
is negative so it is not considered an external competition.
Hence, the buyer 13 is removed from trade.
Case 4b. An external competition for i is found; denote it
by T1. From now on we call this agent i the pivot agent and
its category the pivot category. Denote the pivot category by
go. For each g 6= go, denote by v
T
g the value of the single
agent in T1 ∩Ng. Trade prices are calculated as follows:
• The price pg for each agent in category g 6= go is set to
the value vTg .
• The price po for each agent in category go is set to: po :=
−
∑
g 6=go
vTg .
In the running example, the next member of S1 (after the
buyer 13 is removed) is the seller −5. The maximum GFT
of a PS that contains this seller and agents fromNrm is +1,
for the PS (13,−5,−7); note that the removed buyer 13 par-
ticipates in this PS. This GFT is positive so it is an external
competition; the pivot category go is the sellers’ category.
The prices are set to 13 for the buyers (like the buyer
in T1), −7 for the mediators (like the mediator in T1), and
−6 = −(13−7) for the sellers. The final price-vector is thus
(13,−6,−7), i.e., all buyers pay 13, all sellers receive 6 and
all mediators receive 7.
Step 5. Once the prices are calculated, the final trade is
determined as follows:
• For each category, count the number of members remain-
ing in the trade.
• In each category with the smallest count, all agents par-
ticipate in the trade.
• In each category with a larger count, there is a lottery de-
termining who will participate in the trade.
In the running example, there are two remaining buyers
(17, 14) all of whom trade at price 13; there are three re-
maining sellers (−1,−4,−5) two of whom (selected at ran-
dom) trade at price −6; similarly, there are three remaining
mediators (−1,−3,−4) two of whom trade at price −7.
Note that selecting a different one of the 6 category-orders
leads to a different outcome. A-priori, there is no reason to
prefer one ordering over the other — our auction has the
same desirable properties (proved below) for any ordering.
The SBBA auction of
Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann (2016) is a spe-
cial case of our auction, where the recipe is (1, 1). Their two
variants correspond to the two orderings — buyers-sellers
or sellers-buyers.
3.2 Proof of correctness
First, note that there must be an agent i ∈ S1 for whom an
external competition exists. In the worst case, when only one
last agent of S1 remains in the trade, the other agents of S1
(who were previously removed from trade) form an external
competition for this agent. This is because their total GFT is
GFT(S1), which is positive since S1 is in the optimal trade.
Lemma 1. For each category g ∈ G, denote by vSg the value
of the single agent in S1 ∩Ng. Then:
∑
g 6=go
vTg ≤
∑
g 6=go
vSg
Proof. For g < go, the agent in S1 ∩Ng had been removed
from trade before the pivot was found, and was later used as
an external competition for the pivot, so it is the same agent
as in T1 ∩Ng and thus v
T
g = v
S
g .
For g > go, the agent in S1 ∩ Ng had not been removed
from trade, and thus, another (non-trading) agent was used
as an external competition. Since the values of non-trading
agents are smaller than that of trading agents, vTg ≤ v
S
g .
Now we prove the properties of the auction.
Theorem 1. The external-competition auction of Subsec-
tion 3.1 is strongly-budget-balanced, individually-rational
and dominant-strategy truthful, and its gain-from-trade ap-
proaches the optimum when the optimal market size (k) ap-
proaches∞.
Proof. Strong budget balance is obvious: the price po is cal-
culated such that the sum of prices in each PS is 0.
Individual rationality: we prove that the price paid by
each trading agent is at most the agent’s reported value.
• Each trading agent in a category g 6= go pays the value v
T
g
of a non-trading agent in the same category g. The agents
in each category are ordered by descending value, and the
value of each trading agent is at least as large as the value
of each non-trading agent in the same category, so it is at
least vTg .
• Let vSo be the value of the pivot agent (who is an agent
in S1). By definition of external competition, the sum of
values of agents in T1 plus v
S
o is at least 0, so
vSo +
∑
g 6=go
vTg ≥ 0
=⇒ vSo ≥ −
∑
g 6=go
vTg = po
Since agents are ordered by descending value, the values
of other trading agents are at least vSo which is at least po.
Truthfulness: By Myerson’s theorem, it is sufficient to
prove that the choice rule is monotone, and each trading
agent pays his/her threshold value.
Monotonicity is obvious: an agent increasing his reported
value (while other reports are fixed) is more likely to par-
ticipate in the optimal trade, more likely to have an external
competition, and thus more likely to remain in the trade.
To calculate the threshold value of an agent i from cate-
gory g, we consider three cases, depending on the fixed or-
dering of the categories:
1. The category g comes before the pivot-category go. This
means that an agent from g had been removed from S1 be-
fore the pivot was found. All agents whose value is higher
than vTg are in PS Sj for j ≥ 2, they do not affect the auc-
tion in any way, and they remain in the trade. Any such
agent whose value drops below vTg , replaces the v
T
g agent
in the PS S1, and has no external competition, and so is re-
moved from the trade. Therefore, vTg is a threshold-value
for all agents of g, and indeed pg = v
T
g .
2. g = go. All agents whose value is higher than v
S
o (the
value of the pivot agent) are in PS Sj for j ≥ 2, they
do not affect the auction in any way, and they remain in
the trade. Consider an agent of go whose value vo drops
below vSo but above po (recall that v
S
o ≥ po). We claim
that this agent remains in the trade. First, vo is still in the
optimal trade (it replaces the pivot agent in S1), since:
vo +
∑
g 6=go
vSg ≥ vo +
∑
g 6=go
vTg (by Lemma 1)
= vo − po (by definition of po)
≥ 0 (by assumption on vo),
so the GFT of vo plus the other agents in S1 is still above
0. Second, T1 is still an external competition for vo, since:
vo +
∑
g 6=go
vTg = vo − po ≥ 0.
But, once vo drops below po, the set T1 is no longer an
external competition, so the agent is removed from the
trade. Hence, po is a threshold value for all agents of go.
3. The category g comes after the pivot-category go. This
means that no agent from g had been removed from the
trade before the pivot was found. As shown in Lemma 1,
in this case vSg ≥ v
T
g . All agents whose value is higher
than vSg are in PS Sj for j ≥ 2, they do not affect the
auction in any way, and they remain in the trade.
Consider an agent of g whose value vg drops below v
S
g but
above vTg . We claim that this agent remains in the optimal
trade (it replaces the agent vSg in S1), since:
GFT (S1)− v
S
g + vg ≥ GFT (S1)− v
S
g + v
T
g
= vSo +
∑
g 6=go
vSg − v
S
g + v
T
g
≥ vSo +
∑
g 6=go
vTg (by Lemma 1)
≥ 0 (T1 is external competition)
so the GFT of vg plus the other agents in S1 is above 0.
But, once vg drops below v
T
g , it is replaced by the agent
vTg in S1, and does not enter the optimal trade. Hence, v
T
g
is a threshold-value for all agents of g, and pg = v
T
g .
Gain-from-trade: For each g ∈ G and j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
denote by vjg the value of the single agent in Ng ∩ Sj . Then
the optimal GFT is:
OPT =
∑
g∈G
k∑
j=1
vjg
If no traders are removed, then all these k PS are trading,
and the GFT equals OPT. If some traders are removed, they
are removed from S1 which is the least profitable PS. In this
case, k − 1 deals are made, where in each deal, the trader
from each category g is:
• If g is before the pivot — one of the k − 1 high-value
traders in g;
• If g is the pivot or after the pivot — one of the k high-
value traders in g, selected at random.
Hence, the expected GFT is at least:
∑
g<go
k∑
j=2
vjg +
∑
g≥go
k − 1
k
k∑
j=1
vjg
≥
∑
g∈G
k − 1
k
k∑
j=1
vjg
=
k − 1
k
OPT.
3.3 Ascending-prices auction
Our ascending-prices auction holds a price pg for each cat-
egory g ∈ G. All prices are initialized to −∞, and initially
all agents are in the trade (since every agent will be happy to
pay −∞). While the prices increase, each agent in category
g with value vg remains in the trade as long as pg < vg ,
and exits the trade when pg > vg (since the prices increase
monotonically, agents never return to the trade after exiting).
When pg = vg , the agent is indifferent between trading and
not trading; for simplicity, we assume that in this case the
agent does not trade. Also, for simplicity we assume that the
agents’ valuations are generic in the sense that, for each cat-
egory g ∈ G, all agents have different values. During the
presentation of the ascending auction, we use the same run-
ning example as in Subsection 3.1.
Step 1: Initialization. For each category g, count the
number of agents in Ng; let nmin be the size of the smallest
category. For each category g with more than nmin agents,
increase the price pg such that some agents leave the trade,
until the number of remaining agents in all categories is
nmin.
In the running example, this step is not needed since ini-
tially there are 5 agents in each category.
Step 2. Loop over the categories in the pre-specified order.
For each category g, increase pg continuously until one of
the following happens:
(a) an agent from category g exits the trade, or —
(b) the sum of prices increases to zero:
∑
g∈G pg = 0.
In case (a), repeat the step with the next category (after the
last category, return to the first one). If a category becomes
empty, the auction stops and there is no trade.
In case (b), stop and have the agents trade in the final
prices: each agent in category g ∈ G trades at price pg. If, in
some category, there are more remaining agents than in other
categories, then a lottery is used to select who will trade.
In the running example, at the first round, the buyers’
price increases to 6, the sellers’ price increases to -11, the
mediators’ price increases to -10; after the first round, there
are 4 agents remaining in each category, and the sum of
prices is still negative, so we continue. At the second round,
the prices increase to 9, -8, -7 and the sum is still negative.
At the third round, the buyers’ price increases to 13 and the
sellers’ price is increased towards -5, but when it hits -6, the
sum of prices becomes 0 so the auction stops. The final trade
is exactly the same as in the external-competition auction.
Theorem 2. The ascending-prices auction of Subsection 3.3
is strongly-budget-balanced, individually-rational and obvi-
ously truthful, and its gain-from-trade approaches the opti-
mum when the optimal market size (k) approaches∞.
Proof. SBB and IR are immediate from the description.
As for obvious-truthfulness: Li (2017) defines a strategy
S as obviously-dominant (for a given agent) if “for any de-
viating strategy T , starting from an earliest information set
where S and T diverge, the best possible outcome from T
is no better than the worst possible outcome from S”. We
show that, in the ascending-prices auction, for each agent
i in category g, the strategy S of exiting when pg = vi is
obviously-dominant.
The worst outcome from S has a value of 0. We now show
that, for any deviation T , the best possible outcome from T
when S and T diverge has a value of at most 0. Indeed, if
T is exiting too early (at some v′i < vi), then the point at
which S and T diverge is when pg = v
′
i, and at that point
the outcome from T has a value of 0. If T is exiting too late
(at some v′′i > vi), then the point at which S and T diverge is
when pg = vi, and at that point all possible outcomes from
T have a value of 0 or less.
We now analyze the gain-from-trade.
Let go be the category in which the protocol stops. Let
no be the number of traders of this category that remain in
the trade. Then, in each category g < go, there are no − 1
remaining traders, and in each category g ≥ go, there are no
remaining traders.
Recall that k is the number of deals in the optimal trade;
we claim that k = no:
• First, suppose that the price pg of each category g ≥ go is
increased up to the value of the next agent in g (who did
not exit the trade in the actual auction). Since the auction
stopped when the sum of prices hit 0, the sum of prices
after the increase is positive. Each price pg equals the no-
th highest value in category g. This means that there are at
least no procurement-sets with a positive GFT, so k ≥ no.
• Second, suppose that the price pg of each category g ≤ go
is decreased down to the value of the previous agent in g
(who did exit the trade in the actual auction). Now the sum
of prices is negative. Each price pg equals the (no + 1)-
th highest value in category g. This means that there are
not (no + 1) procurement-sets with a positive GFT, so
k < no + 1. Hence, k = no.
So at least k − 1 deals are done. From here, the proof is
identical to the gain-from-trade proof in Theorem 1.
4 General Procurement-Set Recipes
This section extends the previous one by allowing the PS
recipe to be an arbitrary vector of positive integers, rather
than just a vector of ones. For each category g there is an
integer rg ≥ 1, and every PS must contain exactly rg traders
from this category.
We present the mechanisms using a running example in
which there are two categories — buyers and sellers, and
the recipe is (1, 2), so that each PS should contain one buyer
and two sellers. The market contains:
• Five buyers with values: 17, 14, 13, 9, 6.
• Nine sellers with values: -1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -7, -8, -10, -11.
For the external-competition auction we present two
larger running examples: a second example with three cat-
egories, recipe (2, 2, 3), and valuations:
• Buyers: [17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 10, 6]
• Mediators: [−3,−4,−5,−6,−7,−8,−9,−10]
• Sellers: [−1,−2,−3,−4,−5,−6,−7,−8]
and a third example (for illustrating the difference in Step 1
and 2 from Section 3) with two categories, recipe (3, 2), and
valuations:
• Buyers: [20, 18, 16, 9, 2, 1]
• Sellers: [−2,−4,−6,−8,−10,−12,−14]
4.1 External-competition auction
Step 1: PS Construction. Order the agents in each cat-
egory by descending order of their value. Combine the
highest-value agents in each category to a PS. Combine the
next-highest-value agents in each category into a PS. Keep
constructing PS as long as there are enough agents to fol-
low the recipe of a PS. Unlike Section 3, the GFT of a con-
structed PS can be negative. The set of PS with positive GFT
is the optimal trade. Like Section 3 we denote by k the num-
ber of PS in the optimal trade. We denote by w the number
of PS we constructed in total (including the negative GFT
ones if exist).
In the first running example, k = 3 and w = 4. The op-
timal trade contains three PS: (17;−1,−2) with GFT 14,
(14;−3,−4) with GFT 7, and (13;−5,−7) with GFT 1.
The entire PS set contains, besides the three optimal PS, also
(9;−8,−10) with GFT −9. The remaining market, that we
denote byWrm, contains the buyer 6 and the seller−11 (the
agents not in any PS, whether negative or positive).
In the second running example, k = w = 2. The optimal
trade contains two PS: (17, 16;−3,−4;−1,−2,−3) with
GFT 20, and (15, 14;−5,−6;−4,−5,−6)with GFT 3. The
remainingmarketWrm contains the buyers 13, 12, 10, 6, the
mediators−7,−8,−9,−10 and the sellers −7,−8.
In the third running example, k = 1 and w = 2. The op-
timal trade contains the following PS: (20, 18, 16;−2,−4)
with GFT 48. The PS set contains also the following PS:
and (9, 2, 1;−6,−8) with GFT −2. The remaining market
Wrm contains no buyers, and the sellers −10,−12,−14.
Step 2. Order all the procurement-sets (including the neg-
ative ones) by ascending GFT, such that, GFT(S1) ≤
· · · ≤ GFT(Sw). In the first running example, S1 is the PS
(9;−8,−10). In the second running example, S1 is the PS
(15, 14;−5,−6;−4,−5,−6). In the third running example,
S1 is the PS (9, 2, 1;−6,−8).
Step 3. Consider the agents in S1 in the pre-determined or-
der of categories. Inside each category, order the agents by
increasing value. In the first running example, the order is
buyer 9, seller −10, seller −8. In the second running exam-
ple, the order is buyer 14, buyer 15, mediator −6, mediator
−5, seller −6, seller −5, seller −4. In the third running ex-
ample, the order is buyer 1, buyer 2, buyer 9, seller−8, seller
−6.
Let i be the first agent in S1 by this ordering, which has
the lowest value of his category in S1. In the first running
example i is buyer 9, in the second running example i is
buyer 14 and the third running example i is buyer 1.
Step 4. Look for an external competition for i with a
largest GFT. Importantly, an external competition is con-
structed using a single agent from each category g (including
i’s category), which is duplicated rg times. The agents from
categories different than i are selected from the remaining
marketWrm.
For example, to construct an external competition for
buyer 9 in the first running example, we take the highest-
valued non-trading seller −11, create two copies of it, and
get the PS (9,−11,−11). Its GFT is negative so it cannot
serve as external competition. In the second running ex-
ample, to construct an external competition for buyer 14,
we take the highest-valued non trading mediator −7, cre-
ate two copies of it, then take the highest-valued non trad-
ing seller −7, create three copies of it and get the PS
(14, 14;−7,−7;−7,−7,−7). Its GFT is negative so it can-
not serve as external competition. In the third running exam-
ple, to construct an external competition for buyer 1, we take
the highest-valued non trading seller−10, create two copies
of it and get the PS (1, 1, 1;−10,−10). Its GFT is negative
so it cannot serve as external competition.
Now, there are two cases.
Case 4a. No external competition for i is found. Then, i
is removed from the trade (and added to Wrm), and we go
back to step 4 with the next agent in S1.
In the first running example, as explained above, there is
no external competition for buyer 9 so it is removed from
trade. Next, we consider the seller −10. We create two
copies of it and add the highest-valued non-trading buyer
(9). We get the PS (9,−10,−10). Its GFT is negative so it
cannot be an external competition. Hence, seller −10 is re-
moved from trade. Similarly, we remove the seller −8, the
buyer 13, and the seller −7,
In the second running example, as explained above, there
is no external competition for buyer 14 so it is removed from
trade. Similarly we remove the buyer 15. and the mediators
−6 and −5.
In the third running example, as explained above, there is
no external competition for buyer 1 so it is removed from
trade. Similarly we remove the buyer 2.
Case 4b. An external competition for i is found; denote it
by Ico. We denote the pivot category by go.
In the first running example, the next agent to check is
seller −5. The buyer 13 serves as an external competition
for it, since the GFT of (13,−5,−5) is positive. Hence the
pivot category is the category of sellers.
In the second running example, the next agent to check
is seller −6. The buyer 15 and seller −5 and their copies
serve as an external competition for it, since the GFT of
(15, 15,−5,−5,−6,−6,−6) is positive. Hence the pivot
category is the category of sellers.
In the third running example, the next agent to check is
buyer 9. The seller −10 serves as an external competition
for it, since the GFT of (9, 9, 9;−10,−10) is positive. Hence
the pivot category is the category of buyers.
The trade-prices are calculated as follows:
• The price pg for each agent in category g 6= go is set to
the value vg of the single agent in Ico ∩ Ng. Note that,
even if rg > 1, there is still a single agent in Ico, which
we duplicate rg times.
In the first running example, the price for a buyer is set to
13. In the second running example, the price for a buyer
is set to 15 and the price for a mediator is set to −5. In the
third running example, the price for a seller is set to −10.
• The price po for each agent in category go is set to: po :=
−(
∑
g 6=go
rg · vg)/ro.
In the first running example, the price for each seller is
set to −13/2 = −6.5. In the second running example, the
price for each seller is set to −(15 ∗ 2 + (−5) ∗ 2)/3 =
−6.67. In the third running example, the price for each
buyer is set to −((−10) ∗ 2)/3 = 6.67.
The trade is calculated just like in Section 3. In the first
running example, there are two remaining buyers (17, 14)
and all of them trade at price 13; there are five remaining
sellers (−1,−2,−3,−4,−5) and four of them, selected at
random, trade at price−6.5. In the second running example,
there are two remaining buyers (17, 16) and all of them trade
at price 15; there are two remaining mediators (−3,−4) and
all of them trade at price −5; there are six remaining sell-
ers (−1,−2,−3,−4,−5,−6) and three of them, selected at
random, trade at price −6.67. In the third running exam-
ple, there are four remaining buyers (20, 18, 16, 9) and three
of them, selected at random, trade at price 6.67; There are
four remaining sellers (−2,−4,−6,−8) and two of them,
selected at random, trade at price −10.
As an additional illustration of the mechanism, suppose it
is run on the same market as above, but with a different cat-
egory order: sellers before buyers. Then, in the first running
example, the agents in S1 are checked in order (−10,−8, 9).
Seller −10 is considered first. The highest-valued non-
trading buyer is 6, but the GFT of the PS (−10,−10, 6) is
negative, so −10 is removed. Similarly, −8 is removed and
so is buyer 9, seller −7 and seller −5. Now, buyer 13 has
an external competition — the removed seller −5, since the
GFT of (13,−5,−5) is positive. The seller price is set to−5
and the buyer price is set to −(−5 · 2) = 10. There are four
remaining sellers (−1,−2,−3,−4) and all of them trade at
price −5; there are three remaining buyers (17, 14, 13) and
two of them, selected at random, trade at price +10.
In the second running example if we consider a dif-
ferent category order, for instance: mediators then sell-
ers and last buyers. Then, the agents in S1 are checked
in order (−6,−5,−6,−5,−4, 14, 15). Mediator −6 is
considered first. The highest-valued non-trading buyer is
13 and the highest-valued non-trading seller is −7, but
the GFT of the PS (−6,−6,−7,−7,−7, 13, 13) is nega-
tive, so mediator −6 is removed. Similarly, mediator −5
is removed. Then seller −6 is considered. The highest-
valued non-trading buyer is 13 and the highest-valued
non-trading mediator is −5, but the GFT of the PS
(−5,−5,−6,−6,−6, 13, 13) is negative, so seller −6 is re-
moved. Now, seller −5 has an external competition — the
removed mediator −5 and non-trading buyer 13, since the
GFT of (−5,−5,−5,−5,−5, 13, 13) is positive. The buyer
price is set to 13, the mediator price is set to −5 and the
seller price is set to −(13 · 2 + (−5) · 2)/3 = −5.3. There
are four remaining buyers (17, 16, 15, 14) and two of them,
selected at random, trade at price 13; there are two remain-
ing mediators (−3,−4) and all of them trade at price −5;
there are five remaining sellers (−1,−2,−3,−4,−5) and
three of them, selected at random, trade at price−5.3.
In the third running example, the agents in S1 are checked
in order (−8,−6, 1, 2, 9). Seller −8 is considered first.
There are no buyers that are not part of a PS, so −8 is re-
moved. Similarly seller −6 is removed. Buyer 1 is consid-
ered next. The highest-valued non-trading seller is −6, but
the GFT of the PS (1, 1, 1,−6,−6) is negative, so buyer 1
is removed. Similarly buyer 2 is removed. Now, buyer 9 has
an external competition — the removed seller −6, since the
GFT of (9, 9, 9,−6,−6) is positive. The seller price is set
to −6 and the buyer price is set to −(−6 · 2)/3 = 4. There
are two remaining sellers (−2,−4) and all of them trade at
price−6; there are four remaining buyers (20, 18, 16, 9) and
three of them, selected at random, trade at price+4.
4.2 Proof of correctness
First we prove a claim regarding the reduction processes
that will help us to prove the economic properties. Below,
by negative PS we mean a procurement-set with a negative
GFT.
Claim 1. The trade-reduction process either removes all
agents in negative PS, or leaves a strict subset of a single
negative PS, which is the negative PS with the highest GFT.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Sj is a negative PS and
none of its agents were removed from the trade. Consider
the pivot agent — the agent with lowest value in Sj ∩Ngo .
Since no agent of Sj were removed, this agent has an exter-
nal competition. By definition of external competition, it has
a positive GFT, but it is made of agents that are not in the
trade. Since agents are considered by ascending value, the
values of the agents in the external competition are lower
than the values of agents from the same categories in Sj .
Hence, the GFT of Sj is positive too — contradicting the
assumption that Sj has a negative GFT.
Since the agents are removed by the order of the PS,
which is an ascending order of GFT, if a PS (or a part of
it) is removed, then all PS with a lower GFT are removed as
well.
We conclude from claim 1 that the pivot agent will be
found either in Sw−k+1 — the PS with the smallest positive
GFT, or in Sw−k — the PS with the largest negative GFT
(note that in Section 3 the pivot agent was always found in
the PS with the smallest positive GFT).
Individual rationality: we prove that the price of each
trading agent is at most the agent’s reported value.
• Each trading agent in a category g 6= go pays the value vg
of a non-trading agent in the same category g. The agents
in each category are ordered by value, and the value of
each trading agent is at least as large as the value of each
non-trading agent in the same category, so it is at least vg .
• Each trading agent in the pivot category pays po, which is
calculated such that: ro · po +
∑
g 6=go
rg · vg = 0. Let vo
be the value of the pivot agent. By definition of external
competition, ro ·vo+
∑
g 6=go
rg ·vg ≥ 0, so vo ≥ po. Since
agents are ordered by value, the values of other trading
agents are at least vo which is at least po.
Truthfulness. As in Section 3, the monotonicity of the
choice-rule is obvious, and we focus on proving that each
trading agent pays his/her threshold value.
Assume first that the agent with vo is found in PS Sw−k
(the proof for the case Sw−k+1 is similar). To calculate the
threshold value of an agent i from category g, we consider
three cases w.r.t. the fixed category ordering:
1. The category g comes before the pivot-category go. This
means that rg agents from g had been removed from
Sw−k before the pivot was found. The highest-valued re-
moved agent, whose value was denoted by vg , partici-
pated in the external competition. All agents whose value
is higher than vg are in PS Sj for j ≥ (w−k)+1, they do
not affect the mechanism in any way, and they remain in
the trade. Any such agent whose value drops below vg , re-
places the vg agent in the PS Sw−k, has no external com-
petition, and is removed from the trade. Therefore, vg is
a threshold-value for all trading agents of g, and indeed
pg = vg.
2. g = go. All agents whose value is higher than vo (the
value of the pivot agent) are in PS Sj for j ≥ w− k, they
do not affect the mechanism in any way, and they remain
in the trade. Consider such agent i whose value vi drops
below vo but above po (recall that vo ≥ po). We claim
that Ico is still an external competition for this agent. This
is because, when each agent in Ico is duplicated in accor-
dancewith the PS recipe, the sum of their values is−ro·po
(by definition of po). Adding ro copies of vi gives a total
GFT of ro·vi−ro·po = ro·(vi−po) ≥ 0. Hence, this agent
remains in the trade. But an agent whose value drops be-
low po no longer has an external competition, since now
vi − po < 0, and thus is removed from the trade. There-
fore, po is indeed a threshold-value for all agents of go.
3. The category g comes after the pivot-category go.
This means that no agent fromNg ∩ Sj , for any j ≥ w −
k, had been removed from the trade before the pivot was
found. So vg must be the highest value of a member of
Sw−k−1∩Ng . Let v
′
g be the next-highest value of an agent
in g — the lowest value of a member in Sw−k ∩ Ng. All
agents whose value is higher than v′g are in PS Sj for j ≥
w − k, they do not affect the mechanism in any way, and
they remain in the trade.
Any such agent i whose value vi drops below v
′
g but
above vg becomes a member of Sw−k, since the highest-
valued rg · (w − k) agents of Ng are divided into w − k
procurement-sets, and vi is still among the highest-valued
rg · (w − k) agents (albeit the lowest-valued of them).
Since no agent of Sw−k ∩Ng is removed in this case, vi
remains in the trade.
In contrast, if vi drops below vg, then it becomes a mem-
ber of Sw−k−1. Since vg did not have an external compe-
tition, vi too does not have an external competition and is
removed from trade.
Therefore, vg is a threshold-value for all agents of g, and
indeed pg = vg .
Gain-from-trade. Consider first the case in which all neg-
ative PS have been removed. Then the situation is similar to
the one in Theorem 1: all agents in the k − 1 highest pos-
itive PS participate in the lottery, plus some agents in the
kth-highest positive PS (denoted here by Sw−k+1). There-
fore, for each category g and for each j ≥ w − k + 2, each
member of Sj ∩Ng participates in the lottery. In the lottery,
at least (k − 1) · rg agents of each category g are selected
at random out of at most k · rg . Therefore, each agent has
a chance of at least ((k − 1) · rg)/(k · rg) to participate in
the trade. The expected contribution to the GFT of each such
agent with value vi is vi(k−1)/k. By the linearity of expec-
tation, we can sum over all agents in Ng and all k − 1 PS.
We get that the expected GFT is at least (k − 1)/k of OPT.
Consider now the case in which some agents in a negative
PS are not removed. By Claim 1, all these agents must be
in the PS Sw−k, which is the (k + 1)-th highest PS. During
the lottery, k · rg agents of each category g are selected at
random, and k new PS are formed. We can assume w.l.o.g.
that all agents from Sw−k (if any) are put in a single new
PS. Note that this new PS must have a positive GFT, since
all non-removed agents (even the agents in Sw−k) have an
external competition. This means that they have a positive
GFT when combined with some non-trading agents, whose
values are even lower than the values of trading agents. The
remaining k− 1 new PS contain only agents from the k pos-
itive PS. Each agent from these k PS has a chance of at least
(k−1)/k to participate in the trade. Hence the expected GFT
is at least (k − 1)/k of OPT, as above.
4.3 Ascending-prices auction
Similarly to subsection 3.3, the auction maintains a price pg
for each category g. All prices are initialized to −∞, and
initially all agents are in the trade.
Step 1: Initialization. For each category g, let cg :=
floor(|Ng|/rg); this is the largest number of PS that can be
composed of agents of category g. Let cmin := ming∈G cg;
this is the largest number of PS that can be composed
of the existing agents. For each category g for which
floor(|Ng|/rg) > cmin, increase the price pg such that some
agents leave the trade, until the number of remaining agents
in each category g decreases such that floor(|Ng|/rg) =
cmin. Note that, when g is the category for which the min-
imum of cg is attained, we already have floor(|Ng|/rg) =
cmin without any increase, so the price of this category (at
least) remains −∞, and the initial price-sum is negative.
Initialize c := cmin. Informally, c is the number of
procurement-sets that we aim to construct from the traders
currently in the market. Note that initially, for every category
g, we have floor(|Ng|/rg) = cmin so |Ng| ≥ rg · c.
In the running example, cbuyers = floor(5/1) = 5 and
csellers = floor(9/2) = 4 and cmin = 4. In the initializa-
tion step, pbuyers increases to 6 so that the low-value buyer
leaves. The market now has 4 buyers and 9 sellers. The value
of c is initially 4.
Step 2. Loop over the categories in the pre-specified order.
For each category g, increase pg until one of the following
happens:
(a) The number of agents in g drops to rg · c, or —
(b) The weighted sum of prices increases to zero, where
the weights are the recipe constants, i.e.:
∑
g∈G rg · pg = 0.
In case (a), repeat the step with the next category in the
pre-specified order. After the last category, set c := c − 1
and cycle back to the first category. If c drops to 0 then the
auction ends and there is no trade.
In case (b), the auction terminates and the agents trade in
the final prices. If, in some category, there are more remain-
ing agents than needed to fill the procurement-sets, then a
lottery is used to select who will trade.
In the running example, at the first round, psellers in-
creases to −11 so that one seller leaves. Now there are 4
buyers and 8 sellers so exactly 4 PS are supported. How-
ever, the price-sum is 6+2 · (−11) < 0. Hence, we decrease
c to 3 and continue.
In the second round, pbuyers increases to 9 such that one
buyer leaves, and psellers increases to −8 such that two sell-
ers leave. The weighted sum of prices is 9 + 2 · (−8) < 0,
so we decrease c to 2 and continue.
In the third round, pbuyers increases to 13 such that one
buyer leaves. We start increasing psellers towards −5 such
that two sellers would leave, but during the increase, the
price hits −6.5, and then the sum of prices is 13 + 2 ·
(−6.5) = 0, so the auction stops.
There are now two remaining buyers (17, 14) and five re-
maining sellers (−1,−2,−3,−4,−5).All remaining buyers
trade and pay 13; 4 out of 5 remaining sellers are selected at
random, they trade and receive 6.5.
Theorem 3. The ascending-prices auction of Subsection 4.3
is strongly-budget-balanced, individually-rational and obvi-
ously truthful, and its gain-from-trade approaches the opti-
mum when the optimal market size (k) approaches∞.
Proof. SBB, IR and truthfulness are obvious — just as in
Theorem 2. We now analyze the gain-from-trade. Let c∗ be
the final value of c. Note that the number of agents remaining
in each category g is at least rg · c∗ and at most rg · (c∗+1).
We claim that c∗ ≤ k ≤ c∗ + 1:
• First, suppose that the price pg of each category g is in-
creased such that exactly rg · c∗ agents remain. Now the
sum of prices is positive, and each price pg equals the
(rg · c∗ + 1)-th highest value in category g. This means
that there are at least c∗ procurement-sets with a positive
GFT, so k ≥ c∗.
• Second, suppose that the price pg of each category g is
decreased to its value at the end of round c∗+1, such that
exactly rg · (c∗+1) agents remain. Now the sum of prices
is negative. Each price pg equals the (rg · c∗ + rg + 1)-th
highest value in category g. The expression (rg ·c∗+rg+
1) is at most rg ·(c∗+2), with equality holding iff rg = 1.
This means that there are not (c∗ + 2) procurement-sets
with a positive GFT, so k ≤ c∗ + 1.
Hence, in each category g, the number of agents participat-
ing in the lottery is at least (k−1)·rg and at most (k+1)·rg .
In the lottery, at least (k−1)·rg agents fromNg are selected.
Therefore, each agent from the k · rg agents in the optimal
trade has a chance of at least (k− 1)/(k+1) to win the lot-
tery. Therefore, the expected GFT is at least (k− 1)/(k+1)
of OPT.
5 Related Work
The literature on two-sided markets is large
and we do not attempt to cover it here; see
e.g. (Brustle et al. 2017; Babaioff et al. 2018;
Babaioff, Goldner, and Gonczarowski 2020) for some
recent references. Below we focus on auctions for markets
with three or more sides.
Babaioff and Nisan (2004) handle a multi-sided market
using multiple two-sided sub-markets, where each sub-
market hosts an independent double-auction. Their exam-
ple is the lemonade industry, which consists of lemon pick-
ers, squeezers, and drinkers. In our auction, all three cate-
gories bid together in a single centralized auction with recipe
(1, 1, 1); in their setting, there are three different double-
auctions, one each for pickers, squeezers and drinkers. The
sub-markets are constructed so that the optimal number of
deals is the same in all of them. So if the double-auction
mechanisms make deals as a function of the optimal num-
ber only, their protocol is guaranteed to have a material bal-
ance. However, their protocol does not preserve SBB: in
https://github.com/erelsgl/auctions we have a runnable ex-
ample in which the same SBB double-auction is used in
all sub-markets, but the combined outcome is not SBB.
Babaioff and Nisan (2004) do present a SBB variant of their
mechanism, but only in expectation, and it requires a prior
distribution on the agents’ valuations. In contrast, our mech-
anism is SBB with probability 1, and requires no prior.
Babaioff and Walsh (2005) extend the above work from
a linear supply-chain to an arbitrary directed acyclic graph.
For example, they consider a market in which pickers sell
lemons to squeezers, sugar-makers and squeezers sell to
manufacturers, and manufacturers sell lemonade to drinkers.
It still does not guarantee SBB.
Chen et al. (2005) consider a supply-chain auction with
a sole buyer and single item-kind, but there are different
producers in different supply-locations. The buyer needs a
different quantity of the item in different demand-locations.
The buyer conducts a reverse auction and has to pay, in addi-
tion to the cost of production, also the cost of transportation
from the supply-locations to the demand-locations. They do
not guarantee SBB. (Gonen, Gonen, and Elan 2007) gener-
alized the above settings to a unified trade reduction pro-
cidure.
(McAfee 2008) designs fixed price SBB double auction
under the assumptions that the buyer’s distribution domi-
nates the seller’s distribution or that there is exponential dis-
tribution. Our result does not assume knowledge of the dis-
tribution of participating categories. Additionally, we also
allow for general number of categories as opposed to two.
Colini-Baldeschi et al.; Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016;
2017) also presents SBB auctions. Their auctions target
double-sided and combinatorial markets respectively. How-
ever, their goal is to maximize social welfare as opposed to
our goal which is maximizing gain from trade4. Thus their
mechanisms are not asymptotically-optimal for gain from
trade. They also require a prior on the agents’ valuations.
(Feldman, Frim, and Gonen 2018;
Feldman and Gonen 2018) presents a multilateral ran-
domized market with buyers, mediators and sellers in the
context of ad auctions. Their sellers are pre-associated with
the mediators and they assume that mediators and buyers
arrive over time in some uniform random order. Moreover,
their trade matches are conducted in two stages: first the
mediator trade with the buyer on behalf of his sellers and
then the mediator transfers payments to his matched sellers.
Our auction unites all three categories of buyer, seller and
mediator actions into a single simultaneous trade step.
Some works attempt to handle mechanisms with buy-
ers and sellers interacting through an intermediary or trader
such as (Feldman et al. 2010) and (Blume et al. 2007).
However, their design reduces to a one-sided auction or a
two-sided auction.
The present work handles multiple categories of agents,
but each agent is single-parametric. An orthogonal line
of work (Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann 2018a;
Segal-Halevi, Hassidim, and Aumann 2018b;
Gerstgrasser et al. 2019; Gonen and Egri 2017) remains
with two agent categories (buyers and sellers), but aims to
handle multi-parametric agents. Another orthogonal line
4When optimizing gain from trade we optimize the difference
between the total value of the sold items for the buyers and the total
value of these items for the sellers. When optimizing social welfare
in a market we optimize the sum of the buying agents’ valuations
plus the sum of the unsold items’ value held by selling agents at the
end of trade. Despite their conceptual similarity, the two objectives
are rather different in approximation. In many cases the social wel-
fare approximation is close to the optimal social welfare solution;
however, the gain from trade approximation may not be within any
constant factor of the optimal gain from trade.
of work gets around Myerson –Satterthwaite in a different
way: it relaxes truthfulness but keeps the maximum GFT.
See e.g. Lubin et al. (2008).
6 Experiments
We evaluated the performance of our auctions using a
simulation experiment similar to the one described by
McAfee (1992). For several values of n between 2 and 1000,
and several recipe vectors, we constructed a market with
n · rg agents of each category g, such that the potential num-
ber of procurement-sets is n. The value of each trader was
selected uniformly at random. For each n, we made 50, 000
runs and averaged the results.
We conducted three experiments.5
6.1 Two-sided market
The first experiment was designed to compare our SBB
mechanisms with McAfee’s mechanism. Since McAfee’s
mechanism is designed for procurement-sets with 1 buyer
and 1 seller, we executed both SBB mechanisms with r =
(1, 1). Each buyer’s value was selected from [1, 1000] and
each seller’s value was selected from [−1,−1000].
In each run, we calculated k (the number of deals in the
optimal trade) and OPT (the optimal gain-from-trade). We
found that the average value of k was approximately n/2.
For each mechanism, we calculated k′ (the actual num-
ber of deals done by the mechanism) and the gain-from-
trade. For McAfee’s mechanism, we calculated both the to-
tal gain-from-trade (including both the traders’ gain and the
auctioneer’s profit), and the market gain-from-trade (includ-
ing only the traders’ gain, without the auctioneer’s profit).
In our SBB mechanisms, the auctioneer’s profit is zero by
design, so these two measures are identical.
The results are presented at Table 1. Below are some high-
lights.
• The actual number of trades (k′) is very near k−0.5 for all
auctions. Note that the theoretic lower bound is k−1, i.e.,
the mechanism might lose at most one optimal deal, but
in average it loses about 1/2 optimal deal. This is consis-
tent with the results reported by McAfee (1992), that his
mechanism attains the optimal GFT in about 50% of the
cases.
• Accordingly, the actual GFT ratio is much higher than the
theoretical lower bound. For example, when n = 10 (and
k ≈ 5), the theoretical lower bound is 80%, but all auc-
tions attain more than 90% of the optimal GFT. The loss in
gain-from-trade drops below 1/1000 already for k ≥ 250.
• The External Competition and Ascending Price mecha-
nisms have almost the same performance. This is not sur-
prising, since they are essentially different implementa-
tions of the same rule.
• The total GFT of McAfee’s mechanism is higher than the
GFT of our SBB mechanisms. However, the market GFT
of McAfee’s mechanism is, for all n ≥ 5, lower than the
5 The code used for the experiments and the experiment results
are available at https://github.com/erelsgl/auctions.
GFT of our SBB mechanisms. This indicates that, for all
but the most trivial markets, a strongly-budget-balanced
auction is better for the traders, who enjoy all the surplus
rather than yielding some of it to the auctioneer.
We do not have a sufficient explanation for this; perhaps
this is due to McAfee’s heuristic of “guessing” a price
of (bk+1 + sk+1)/2. In any case, the difference becomes
negligible when k ≥ 50.
6.2 One agent per category
The second experiment considered markets with a recipe
that is a vector of ones, and a varying number of categories.
Since the first experiment indicated that the performance of
the external competition auction is very similar to that of the
ascending prices auction, we did the second experiment only
for the ascending prices auction.
We checked markets with one category of “buyers”
(agents with a positive value) and s categories of “sellers”
(agents with a negative value), where s ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16}.
As in the previous experiment, the value of each seller
was selected uniformly at random from [−1,−1000]. The
value of each buyer was selected uniformly at random from
[1, 1000 · s], such that the average value in the entire market
remained 0. As in the first experiment, the average value of
k was ≈ n/2.6
The results are presented at Table 2. Both k′ and the GFT
increase as the number of agents in each PS increases. This
increase becomes negligible when n grows. Still, it is reas-
suring to see that the performance does not become worse
when the PS become larger.
6.3 Two unbalanced categories
The third experiment checked markets with two categories,
where the recipe is (1, s), for s ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16}. The value of
each buyer was selected uniformly at random from [1, 1000 ·
s], such that the average value in the entire market remained
0. As in the first experiment, the average value of k was ≈
n/2.
The results are presented at Table 3. As in the previous
experiment, both k′ and the GFT increase with the number
of agents in each PS, but the effect becomes negligible when
n grows.
We conclude that, in all scenarios that we checked, our
auctions perform significantly better that than their worst-
case guarantees.
7 Future Work
We are working on extending the SBB auctions in two di-
rections.
6 Based on our empirical results, we believe that k ≈ n/2
whenever the value of each agent is selected uniformly at random,
such that the average value of all agents in the market is 0. How-
ever, proving this formally is an exercise in probability analysis
which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
McAfee External Comp. Ascending Price
n k k′ Total GFT Market GFT k′ GFT k′ GFT
2 0.99 0.58 77.18 69.01 0.5 62.69 0.5 62.26
3 1.49 1.08 88.08 80.05 1 77.75 1 77.93
4 2 1.57 92.45 83.9 1.5 84.39 1.5 84.36
5 2.49 2.04 94.61 86.08 2 88.03 2 88.01
10 4.99 4.52 98.37 91.78 4.5 94.53 4.5 94.55
15 7.5 7.02 99.22 94.18 7 96.46 6.99 96.44
25 12.5 12.02 99.71 96.35 12 97.92 12.03 97.92
50 24.99 24.49 99.92 98.08 24.5 98.98 24.48 98.99
100 50 49.5 99.98 99.01 49.49 99.49 49.48 99.5
500 249.98 249.48 100 99.8 249.48 99.9 249.48 99.9
1000 500.02 499.52 100 99.9 499.44 99.95 499.52 99.95
Table 1: McAfee’s mechanism versus our SBB mechanisms with the recipe r = (1, 1).
2 + 1 categories 4 + 1 categories 8 + 1 categories 16 + 1 categories
n k k′ GFT k′ GFT k′ GFT k′ GFT
2 1 0.53 70.1 0.54 74.69 0.55 76.96 0.55 77.91
3 1.5 1.02 82.28 1.03 84.55 1.03 85.83 1.04 86.29
4 2 1.51 87.6 1.52 89.42 1.52 90.18 1.53 90.55
5 2.5 2.01 90.63 2.02 91.88 2.02 92.62 2.02 92.85
10 5.01 4.52 95.83 4.51 96.41 4.51 96.74 4.52 96.89
15 7.51 7.02 97.3 7.01 97.71 7.01 97.9 7.02 98.05
25 12.52 12.02 98.42 12.02 98.68 12.02 98.81 12.02 98.86
50 25.02 24.52 99.23 24.53 99.36 24.52 99.42 24.51 99.45
100 50.02 49.52 99.62 49.53 99.68 49.51 99.71 49.53 99.73
500 250.23 249.73 99.92 249.67 99.94 249.67 99.94 249.62 99.95
1000 500.37 499.87 99.96 499.85 99.97 499.79 99.97 499.77 99.97
Table 2: The SBB ascending-prices auction where the recipe is a vector of ones, with different numbers of categories.
r = (1, 2) r = (1, 4) r = (1, 8) r = (1, 16)
n k k′ GFT k′ GFT k′ GFT k′ GFT
2 1 0.6 74.44 0.67 81.04 0.7 84.5 0.72 86.01
3 1.5 1.11 84.82 1.17 87.76 1.2 89.17 1.21 89.6
4 2 1.61 89.16 1.67 91.28 1.7 92.21 1.72 92.74
5 2.51 2.12 91.69 2.17 93.24 2.21 93.94 2.21 94.29
10 5 4.62 96.07 4.68 96.75 4.71 97.07 4.73 97.27
15 7.49 7.12 97.44 7.18 97.86 7.22 98.08 7.23 98.19
25 12.5 12.13 98.48 12.17 98.73 12.21 98.85 12.22 98.92
50 25.01 24.63 99.25 24.67 99.37 24.7 99.44 24.72 99.46
100 49.98 49.6 99.62 49.67 99.69 49.69 99.72 49.7 99.73
500 249.99 249.61 99.93 249.58 99.94 249.63 99.94 249.64 99.95
1000 499.83 499.46 99.96 499.48 99.97 499.5 99.97 499.49 99.97
Table 3: The SBB ascending-prices auction with two categories and different recipes.
7.1 Multiple procurement-set recipes
In a general market, several kinds of procurement-sets may
be possible. Such a market can be represented by a finite set
R, which contains one or more recipe-vectors of length |G|.
Some simple special cases are already handled by the cur-
rent mechanisms. For example, consider a market with three
categories andR = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)}. In this market, each
deal requires one agent of category 1 and one agent of cate-
gory either 2 or 3. It is easy to see that this market is equiv-
alent to a market with a single recipe R = {(1, 1)}, since
categories 2 and 3 can be united and treated as a single cat-
egory. Both the calculation of the optimal trade and the cal-
culation of the external competition work exactly as with the
current mechanism.
Things become more interesting when the recipes are not
equivalent, for example when R = {(1, 1, 0), (2, 0, 1)}.
For concreteness, denote the the three categories by seller,
buyer and combiner, so that each deal requires either a
seller+buyer, or two sellers and a combiner. In this case,
the optimal trade can no longer be computed by a simple
greedy algorithm as in the case of a single recipe. To see
this, consider the special case in which there are n sellers,
all of whom have a value of 0. Then the problem is just
to choose buyers and combiners. This is an instance of the
KNAPSACK problem, in which the weight of each buyer is 1
and the weight of each combiner is 2. It is known that greedy
algorithms yield sub-optimal solutions to this problem. For
example, in the following market:
• Buyers: [99, 51]
• Combiner: [100]
• Sellers: [0, 0, ...]
If there are two sellers, then the optimal trade requires the
two buyers, so the greedy algorithm that selects higher-
valued agents first is not optimal (it selects only the com-
biner). On the other hand, if there are three sellers, then
the optimal trade requires the combiner and the highest-
valued buyer, so the greedy algorithm that selects agents
with higher value/weight ratio is not optimal (it selects the
two buyers).
Since the weights are integers, the optimal trade can be
computed in pseudo-polynomial time using a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm. However, the ascending-price auction
effectively induces a greedy selection of traders (since it
induces only the highest-valued traders to remain), which
might be sub-optimal.We believe that, if the weights are suf-
ficiently small and the market is sufficiently large, then the
greedy algorithm (and hence the ascending-prices auction)
can still yield a good approximation of the optimal GFT.
However, proving this in all cases, as well as studying other
combinations of recipes, is a challenge for future work.
7.2 Transaction costs
In general, each procurement-set may have a different cost-
of-transaction, depending on the geographic locations of the
agents in the PS, as well as other factors. Such transac-
tion costs make the computation of the optimal trade dif-
ficult, even before strategic considerations, and even when
all transaction costs are common knowledge.
We have preliminary results showing that, without any re-
strictions on the transaction costs, there might be no mech-
anism that satisfies all the desirable properties of Theorem
1. It is interesting to see whether such a mechanism can
be found under some natural restrictions on the transaction
costs, such as the ones described by Chu and Shen (2006).
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